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Abstract
Economic incentives in the context of a particular type of market failure—asymmetric information (which takes place when 
quality information relating to treatment is not available to patients before purchasing the treatment)—are highly relevant to 
the understanding of the lack of clinics’ incentives to disclose reliable evidence (relating to treatment quality) in the practice 
of evidence-based medicine. Based on the case study of the UK in vitro fertilisation (IVF) sector, I show that inadequate 
quality provision (relating to treatment effectiveness and safety) can be associated with a lack of voluntary disclosure of 
reliable evidence in the practice of evidence-based medicine. In the absence of sufficient economic incentives on clinics to 
voluntarily acquire and disclose evidence, I discuss the rationale for legislation requiring mandatory evidence disclosure as 
a possible mechanism to facilitate the acquisition and revelation of evidence. I do so by drawing evidence from the economic 
literature relating to the impact of such legislation on firms’ quality improvement. Practical implications for implementation 
are discussed (and illustrated with examples in the context of the UK IVF sector) with the purpose to facilitate the role of 
regulators in setting the standards for evidence disclosure to improve interpretability of such evidence, together with the role 
of patients in engaging with clinics and verifying such evidence to improve its reliability and, ultimately, quality of care. 
On 5 January 2021, the author submitted a response to a public 
consultation initiated by the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA draft guidance for fertility clinics on consumer law: public 
consultation) based on some of the content in this paper.
 * Minyan Zhu 
 minyan.zhu@reading.ac.uk
1 Department of Economics, University of Reading, 
Whiteknights Campus, Reading RG6 6EL, UK
Key Points for Decision Makers 
The observation of a lack of voluntary quality disclosure 
can reflect suboptimal quality standards in healthcare.
Legislation requiring mandatory disclosure relating 
to treatment quality could be a non-market solution to 
the problem of inadequate quality standards in some 
segments of the healthcare sector where patients are 
responsive to such disclosure.
Care must be taken when designing such measures to 
avoid adverse incentives.
The role of patients in verifying and improving the 
accountability of disclosure should be promoted, espe-
cially with the increasing availability of digital platforms 
for quality review and information sharing.
1 Introduction
The role of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in modern 
medical professions remains controversial. Growing con-
cerns relating to the quality of evidence along with growing 
practices of EBM (for example, Djulbegovic and Guyatt [1] 
summarised the progress in EBM during the last quarter 
century) raise a valid question as to whether the practice of 
EBM ultimately improves the quality of patient care (see, 
for example, a recent debate by Djulbegovic et al. [2, 3] and 
Mondoux and Shojania [4]). This paper aims to provide an 
economic perspective when evaluating the role of EBM in 
delivering treatment quality. I highlight that economic incen-
tives in the context of a particular type of market failure—
asymmetric information (which takes place when informa-
tion relating to treatment quality is not available to patients 
before purchasing the treatment)—are highly relevant to the 
observation and understanding of the lack of clinics’ disclo-
sure of reliable evidence (relating to treatment quality) in the 
practice of EBM.
A market with low transparency of pre-purchase quality 
information available to buyers may discourage high-quality 
sellers from serving in this market. This is because the pres-
ence of low-quality sellers (taking the advantage of pooling 
with high-quality sellers) adversely affects uninformed buy-
ers’ perception of the ‘average’ quality for which they are 
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or would be willing to pay. The ultimate result could be that 
there are a large number of low-quality sellers who have the 
incentive to withhold evidence/information relating to their 
own quality; in other words, low-quality provision associated 
with a lack of reliable evidence.
In the paper, the above and related economic incentives 
are illustrated in detail based on a case study of the UK fer-
tility sector. I focus on the UK fertility sector because there 
are growing concerns relating to the observation that cer-
tain treatments, especially add-on treatments,1 in the sector 
are not always based on reliable evidence (see, for example, 
discussions by Heneghan et al. [5]). Concerned that certain 
in vitro fertilisation (IVF) clinic practices may be prevent-
ing or inhibiting patients from making informed choices, 
the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK’s 
primary competition and consumer authority, published in 
November 2020 a draft guidance [6] for UK fertility clinics 
on consumer law with the purpose of helping fertility clinics 
understand and comply with their existing obligations under 
consumer law. At the time of writing, the CMA has not yet 
ruled out possible law enforcement actions against fertility 
clinics. The case therefore allows us to better understand 
possible reasons for the lack of reliable evidence in practice 
(Sects. 2 and 3) and possible ways to address it (Sect. 4).
Following Lambert [7], I consider EBM as “a set of 
techniques and practices squarely to the deployment of sta-
tistical measurements of outcome derived from population 
research”.2 For the purpose of the paper (relating to qual-
ity incentives and outcomes), evidence when referred to as 
EBM is used to specifically focus on measured quality out-
comes relating to treatment effectiveness and safety.
2  A Review of Economic Evidence Relating 
to Quality Provision and Voluntary Quality 
Disclosure in the Context of Asymmetric 
Information
As consumers, we often have to purchase products/services 
without necessarily having the information to judge their 
quality prior to purchase. Examples would be healthcare ser-
vices or durable goods. Sellers may know the quality of the 
item they sell but it may be in their interest to withhold that 
information. It is a well-established principle of econom-
ics that such markets associated with the market failure of 
asymmetric information (e.g. sellers have more information 
than buyers relating to quality), could suffer from the conse-
quence of low-quality provision [8, 9]. This is explained as 
follows using the example of healthcare clinics.
Patients do not know the quality of a treatment provided 
by a clinic before they undergo the treatment. They have a 
general idea about the expected quality (such as the average 
success rate) of the clinic as well as that of the sector. Based 
on such an expectation, they will decide how much they are 
willing to pay for such a perceived ‘average’ treatment. If 
we have a lot of low-quality clinics providing treatments 
with relatively low success rates, it will lower the patients’ 
expectation of success rates and therefore their willingness 
to pay. If patients’ willingness to pay is sufficiently lowered, 
high-quality clinics that incur more costs and investments 
to provide more successful treatments may decide not to 
provide their service in this market as the expected price is 
not high enough to cover their costs. Therefore, high-quality 
clinics are driven out of the market by the presence of a large 
number of low-quality clinics in the market who find it in 
their interest to hide quality. This results in lower average 
quality provision associated with a lack of quality-related 
evidence available to patients.
The above simplified illustration of an Akerlof-type of 
market failure explains intuitively why quality is likely to 
be underprovided in markets with asymmetric information. 
However the scenario described above is not representative 
of the real-world cases where buyers do not know the aver-
age quality of the goods/services ex ante and they may not 
even be able to observe or assess the quality ex post. Indeed, 
there is a large body of literature focusing on a specific type 
of goods whose quality cannot be evaluated in normal use.3 
In particular, consider an expert (e.g. a doctor) who knows 
more about the type of good or service the buyer (e.g. the 
patient) needs than the buyer themselves.4 The expert seller 
is able to identify the treatment that fits a buyer’s need best 
by performing a diagnosis (hence this type of market is 
also referred to as treatment and diagnosis markets). They 
can then provide the right quality and charge for it, or they 
1 Interventions offered in addition to standard IVF with the purpose 
to improve fertility outcomes.
2 As discussed by Djulbegovic and Guyatt [1], central to the epis-
temology of EBM is that what is justifiable or reasonable to believe 
depends on the trustworthiness of the evidence, and the extent to 
which we believe that evidence is determined by credible processes. 
Whereas it is not the primary purpose of this paper to assess the hier-
archy of different types of evidence, the importance of quality and 
standards of evidence is discussed later in the paper (Sect. 4.2).
3 Referred to as credence goods by Darby and Karni [10].
4 There is also another strand of literature looking at another type of 
credence goods where credence attributes are not correlated to end-
use attributes. For instance, consumer goods are differentiated by 
process-attributes, e.g. organically produced food, as well as by use 
attributes, e.g. taste. The asymmetric information problem exists 
here as consumers cannot verify process-attribute claims, even after 
lengthy inspection or consumption of the good, whereas sellers pos-
sess such information. For this type of goods, success of the service 
is, by definition, not observable. Roe and Sheldon [11] for instance, 
argue how the use of ‘self-labelling’ could be a possible solution to 
mitigate the problem of asymmetric information.
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can exploit the informational asymmetry by defrauding the 
buyer. The literature (see comprehensive reviews provided 
by Dulleck and Kerschbamer [12] and Balafoutas and Ker-
schbamer [13]) establishes that dishonest seller behaviour 
can arise in several dimensions (rather than just the under 
provision of quality mentioned above), including (1) buyers 
being overcharged for the actual treatment they receive but 
cannot observe; (2) buyers being overtreated with unneces-
sary treatment, which buyers do not know if they need; and 
(3) buyers being undertreated with an inadequate treatment 
(the underprovision of quality mentioned above), the out-
come of which buyers cannot observe or verify to hold the 
seller accountable.5
In addition, diagnoses are often imprecise and require a 
certain amount of effort invested by the expert (with health-
care services being a prime example of such a situation). 
Diagnosis effort is often not observable to the buyers. These 
facts could further worsen the problem of asymmetric infor-
mation illustrated here. For instance, how can the expert be 
induced to perform the costly but unobservable diagnosis, 
and how can the expert be induced to reveal the diagnosis 
outcome truthfully?6
In the healthcare setting, it is clear that to assess the 
quality of the treatment, patients need to have information 
regarding what treatment they need, what treatment they 
receive, and the treatment outcome. The above economic 
evidence indicates clinics have a clear lack of incentives to 
acquire and disclose such information.
Incentives for quality disclosure require further explana-
tion. Consider a seller with private (but verifiable) infor-
mation about the quality of their product. Economic theory 
predicts sellers do have incentives to voluntarily disclose 
such quality information, even if it is unfavourable informa-
tion, if certain conditions are satisfied [17–19]. The intuition 
behind this is as follows.
For sellers, voluntary disclosure has the benefit of cor-
recting buyers’ perception of the product quality. If the 
seller does not disclose their private information about the 
product quality, the most they can charge is the value of 
an average-quality product. Thus, if the actual value of the 
product is higher than that of an average product, the seller 
would choose to disclose quality. The consumers, in turn, 
revise downwards their estimate of the quality of products 
whose quality is not disclosed by sellers. This causes more 
types of sellers to disclose, and the process repeats itself 
until all types disclose (‘unravelling’). It follows that all sell-
ers (high- or low-quality type) will voluntarily disclose qual-
ity, implying that costly government-mandated disclosure is 
inefficient and unnecessary.
The above ‘unravelling’ should in principle resolve the 
quality problem associated with asymmetric information. 
However, a number of strong assumptions are required for 
the ideal result to hold. One could view those factors that 
violate the assumptions as forming a quality threshold. If 
firms’ quality level (even though above average) is below the 
threshold, they may decide not to voluntarily disclose qual-
ity unilaterally. Such factors may be the cost of acquiring or 
verifying quality information [17, 20], or whether consumers 
understand or perceive nondisclosure as a signal of the low-
est quality [21, 22], how many firms there are in the market 
[23, 24], how firms compete with each other [25] and how 
competitive they are at setting their prices [26].
To understand whether a lack of voluntary evidence dis-
closure is likely to occur in practice and how that is associ-
ated with clinics’ incentives relating to quality improvement, 
I look at a case study of the UK IVF sector. I first document 
some stylised observations based on the reported results 
from interviews and a survey conducted by the CMA [27] 
and the sector regulator Human Fertilisation and Embryol-
ogy Authority (HFEA) [28]. Based on the stylised obser-
vations, I then illustrate the economic evidence reviewed 
above in the context of the UK IVF sector to understand the 
practical implications of lack of evidence disclosure on treat-
ment quality. I focus on two very important dimensions of 
quality, i.e. the effectiveness and safety of treatments, as they 
are confirmed to be the most important quality attributes of 
IVF treatment by the response data reported by the CMA 
[27] and HFEA [28].
3  A Case Study: The UK In Vitro Fertilisation 
Sector
Every year around 70,000 cycles of IVF treatment take place 
in the UK [29]. The UK fertility market is worth around 
£320 million annually and has enjoyed steady growth over 
recent years [6, 30]. Treatment in the private sector contin-
ues to grow. The share of IVF cycles funded by the NHS 
has declined across most English regions over recent years, 
with 65% of treatment cycles in 2018 in England being self-
funded [29]. I focus the following analysis on private fertility 
clinics that provide IVF treatment to self-funded patients.
5 Earlier studies show if buyers can observe/verify the quality ex 
post, some market mechanisms such as warranties [8], reputation, 
or repeated purchases [14, 15] may work to mitigate the low-quality 
issue. In contrast, the evidence reviewed by Balafoutas and Kersch-
bamer [13] taken together, fails to find a significant or particularly 
systematic impact of reputation on dishonest behaviour in treatment 
and diagnoses markets, possibly relating to the fact that quality is dif-
ficult to verify ex post in these markets.
6 Studies are still limited in this area. Balafoutas and Kerschbamer 
[13] provide a review, and Balafoutas et  al. [16] provide some evi-
dence, that diagnostic uncertainty further increases the possibilities of 
dishonest behaviour by sellers.
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3.1  Stylised Observations
The stylised observations in the UK fertility sector are 
based on the reported results from the national patient sur-
vey data collected in 2018 by the HFEA [28] and findings 
reported in the CMA’s research report [27] when developing 
the draft guidance [6] for fertility clinics and patients men-
tioned above. Further details relating to the two sources of 
information are explained in Appendix 1, with an overview 
of patient responses to treatment quality in Table 1 of the 
Appendix 1.
3.1.1  Observation 1: Incomplete and Sometimes 
Misleading Evidence Disclosure of Success Rates
UK IVF clinics often advertise the headline success rates 
by using the measure that gives them the highest success 
rate. With the revised code of conduct issued by the HFEA 
[31], the reporting of success rates has become more com-
prehensive. However, as reported by the CMA [27], a small 
group of respondents stressed the difficulties they experi-
enced when comparing success rates for different clinics 
due to a perceived lack of consistency in how success rates 
were reported. Another small group questioned the accu-
racy of success rates, based on greater experience of IVF 
treatment and/or a more informed perspective on statistics. 
Many objected to clinics presenting success rates based on 
pregnancies, as respondents were more interested in those 
based on live births.
One prominent response relating to the information dis-
closure of success rates emerging from the survey conducted 
by the HFEA [28] is the lack of information on personal-
ised chance of success. The CMA [27] confirms that many 
respondents reported that success rates of IVF treatment 
were generally discussed in generic rather than personalised 
terms. Although a few reported discussing their personal 
chance of success, most did not, and the specific basis for 
the individual discussions reported (i.e. whether test results, 
scans, age and previous history of IVF and any specific fer-
tility issues) is unclear. For those with unsuccessful experi-
ences, the HFEA [28] responses point out that overestimated 
personal success rates are misleading (see quoted responses 
in Figs. 1 and 2 in Appendix 1).
3.1.2  Observation 2: Incomplete Evidence Disclosure 
of Effectiveness or Safety of Add‑On Treatments 
and Fertility Drugs
The CMA [27] recognises that there is a lack of consistency 
with respect to conveying information about the evidence 
for the effectiveness of add-on treatments to patients, that is, 
informing them there is little or no robust evidence, and of 
the risks where appropriate. Meanwhile, patient responses 
documented by both the CMA [27] and HFEA [28] indicate 
that some patients demand more evidence-based estimates of 
the effectiveness of certain treatments (see quoted responses 
in Fig. 3 in Appendix 1).
Respondents (interviewed by the CMA [27]) who were 
interested in what they described as ‘medication-light IVF’ 
treatment sometimes felt their choice was limited and that 
they had to work harder to find suitable clinics. It is worth 
pointing out that clinics’ incentives are not typically aligned 
with those of the patients. If heavy use of drugs can increase 
the number of eggs retrieved, it means treatment is more 
likely to continue. In addition, the phenomenon of expensive 
fertility drugs in the UK provided by clinics that are often 
linked with dedicated distributors is consistently reported 
among respondents interviewed by the CMA [27]. High 
profit margins associated with these fertility drugs could 
drive overprescription of such drugs. The result is that some 
patients may end up being overprescribed with such drugs, 
incurring high costs, possible adverse effects or long-term 
health risks (imposed on the mother, children, or both).
3.2  Incomplete Evidence Disclosure in the UK 
Fertility Sector May Well Reflect Inadequate 
Quality Provision
If there were clinics providing distinctively high-quality 
treatments in this sector, there should be great incentives for 
them to unilaterally and voluntarily reveal more treatment 
evidence, such as personalised success rate, to demonstrate 
their distinctively high quality. Linking to the economic evi-
dence discussed earlier, I provide a number of reasons for 
this.
First, patients in this sector are largely responsive to qual-
ity information. Treatment effectiveness of a given location 
is the top determining factor considered by patients when 
choosing a clinic, whereas cost as a determining factor is 
quite far down the list in comparison (confirmed both by the 
HFEA [28] and CMA [27]; also see Table 2 in Appendix 1). 
In fact, as some of the responses quoted above indicate (see 
Figs. 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix 1), patients indeed demand 
to know their personal chance of success as a measure of 
treatment quality. This is consistent with existing evidence 
provided by Bundorf et al. [32] that suggests patients are 
responsive to quality report cards when choosing among 
providers in the fertility sector in the US.
Second, cost associated with acquiring and verifying 
quality-related evidence is not prohibitively high. Whereas 
randomised clinical trials could be time-consuming, rou-
tinely collected data by clinics could also reveal useful infor-
mation about the treatment quality at a given clinic. It may 
incur some cost to analyse such data to assess, at least to 
some extent, the effectiveness or safety of the existing treat-
ments and drugs, but overall the cost of a more complete 
EBM and Healthcare Quality in the Context of Information Failure
quality disclosure (than what is currently disclosed) is not 
prohibitively high. Based on patients’ responses documented 
by the CMA [27] and HFEA [28], even evidence based on 
routinely collected data is not typically provided to inform 
patients of potential effectiveness or risk associated with 
treatments.
One may argue that, even if clinics are not directly dis-
closing evidence, they could indirectly signal high-quality 
services (especially if such evidence is difficult to verify), 
for instance through warranty, pricing, advertisement or 
research and development [33, 34]. A quick search of the 
UK IVF clinics’ websites reveals that little to no information 
is available to indicate that these IVF clinics are investing 
competitively in R&D to differentiate their treatments. The 
author is not aware of any clinics in the UK that provide 
any warranty related to treatment outcomes or safety. There 
is also very little evidence to suggest that price differences 
among clinics are signalling distinctive quality levels7.
Therefore, a plausible explanation for incomplete evi-
dence disclosure observed in the sector is that it reflects 
a relatively low or inadequate level of quality provision 
in terms of treatment effectiveness and safety. Indeed, the 
reported live birth rate data strongly indicates there is great 
room for improvement in terms of treatment effectiveness, 
especially considering the relatively high cost associated 
with private IVF treatments in the UK. Note that for every 
10 embryos transferred, on average in the UK in 2018, about 
2.3 embryos survive and develop into live birth [29].
Given that clinics fail to disclose reliable evidence fully 
and voluntarily in practice, especially if the quality of treat-
ment is not sufficiently high, a question that naturally arises 
is ‘Could it be a possible mechanism to facilitate the acquisi-
tion and revelation of more evidence if clinics are required 
by law to disclose such evidence unilaterally, in the absence 
of sufficient economic incentives on clinics to voluntarily 
disclose such evidence?’ I aim to address this question next.
In the CMA’s draft guidance [6], various standards of 
mandatory information disclosure have been established for 
this sector. The information disclosure standards are primar-
ily concerned about transparency, comparability and consist-
ency of the information relating to clinics’ treatment costs. 
The draft guidance makes a much less explicit requirement 
for fertility clinics to disclose quality-related information, 
including evidence on effectiveness and risk associated with 
add-on treatments.
4  Legislating Mandatory Evidence 
Disclosure
4.1  A Review of Economic Evidence Relating 
to the Effect of Mandatory Quality Disclosure 
on Firms’ Quality Provision
Mandatory quality disclosure is extensively examined in the 
economics literature as a non-market solution to problems 
associated with quality provision in the context of asymmet-
ric information. Theoretical evidence of the impact of manda-
tory quality disclosure on quality provision is not clear-cut and 
suggests that the impact depends on the reason for incomplete 
disclosure as mentioned earlier. For instance, when non-disclo-
sure is innocent and due solely to disclosure costs, mandatory 
disclosure is socially excessive [35]. Mandatory disclosure of 
information, but not acquisition of information, may motivate 
sellers to reduce information acquisition [36, 37].
It should be noted studies in this body of theoretical lit-
erature typically maintain the assumption that firms’ quality 
is given, overlooking the possibility that quality disclosure 
can incentivise firms to choose high-quality product. There-
fore, the benefit of mandatory quality disclosure could be 
underestimated in the evidence mentioned above. Taking 
into account quality incentives, Fishman and Hagerty [21] 
show that firms’ incentives to improve quality could be 
higher under the law, even if very few consumers understand 
the disclosure. However, limited attention of buyers means 
greater disclosures of multiple dimensions could reduce the 
average accuracy of buyers’ perception and that a complex 
balance of considerations of discourse of different dimen-
sions is needed [23].
There is fairly strong empirical evidence from a variety of 
markets, indicating that mandatory disclosure could improve 
quality standards (e.g. Mathios [38] provides evidence in the 
food sector, while Bennear and Olmstead [39] provide evi-
dence relating to drinking-water suppliers). In the healthcare 
sector, consistent with the theoretical evidence mentioned 
above, the empirical evidence demonstrates that consumers 
have different receptiveness to mandatory quality reports 
[40–42], implying the effect on quality provision may vary 
depending on consumers’ responsiveness.
Another potential benefit of mandatory disclosure that 
is less studied (theoretically or empirically) is the longer-
term effects associated with better consumer selection and 
matching of products with more complete information [43], 
especially with the rapid development of information and 
communication technology (ICT) and digital platforms to 
dissipate information among consumers. Barriers to search 
or switch clinics could hinder patients from finding the best-
quality clinic and make patients captive to a certain degree, 
creating little incentives on clinics with respect to exercising 
7 Further evidence to support this statement is available from the 
author based on price data collected from each clinic in central Lon-
don.
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the amount of effort expected by the patient to deliver the 
individual outcome. By breaking down such barriers, qual-
ity disclosure may drive out low-quality  clinics, encourage 
entry by high-quality competitors, or incentivise existing 
clinics to improve quality. Such an effect may be achieved 
with the presence of a proportion of consumers who are 
empowered by pre-purchase quality information to improve 
matching and quality selection, generating positive external-
ity on consumers who ignore quality disclosure.
Illustrated in the case of the UK fertility sector, if quality 
provision is indeed a problem in the context of asymmetric 
information as established earlier, and considering patients 
are responsive to and engaging with evidence disclosure, 
legislation requiring mandatory evidence disclosure is likely 
to improve the standard of quality provision. In addition, 
quality information disclosure may help break down any bar-
riers patients face to search and switch clinics (e.g. initial 
consultation fees typically cost around £200 in London, paid 
by patients to find a match; clinic locations as identified by 
the CMA [27] and Table 2 in Appendix 1).
However, the literature in economics suggests that inap-
propriate measures of mandatory information disclosure 
could create adverse incentives on the firms, resulting in 
not only no improvement in quality but even harm to con-
sumers. Therefore, care must be taken when designing such 
measures. An extensive list of examples in the healthcare 
and education sector are reviewed by Dranove and Jin [44]. 
Based on the evidence presented in this body of literature, 
in the following I explain, in the context of the UK fertility 
sector, the implications of implementing mandatory evi-
dence disclosure on the practice of EBM. In particular, I 
highlight the role of regulators in setting the standards of 
disclosed evidence to improve interpretability, and patients’ 
role in engaging with clinics and verifying such evidence to 
improve accountability.
5  The Implications of Implementing 
Mandatory Evidence Disclosure 
for the Practice of Evidence‑Based 
Medicine in the UK Fertility Sector
Mandatory disclosure may fail to achieve any desired impact 
on treatment quality if the evidence disclosed is very difficult 
for patients to interpret or if the information is simply irrel-
evant. Take success rate in the fertility sector as an example. 
The success rate for a female patient aged 30 years with male 
infertility factors may have little relevance to another female 
patient aged 40 years with a completely different infertility 
issue. How can the success rate inferred from a sample of 
patients be easily interpreted by and applicable to individual 
patients?
This is not an insurmountable problem. Each clinic has 
access to the treatment data routinely collected by the clinic. 
Such data can be used to form estimations of personalised 
success rates of IVF treatment. Example 1 in Appendix 2 
illustrates in greater detail how this could be done based on 
an established statistical model adopted by NHS England 
for a different purpose (which is to compare risk-adjusted 
hospital-level mortality rates). I illustrate in the example 
how the relevant statistical model can be used to estimate 
with a certain degree of precision the expected rate of suc-
cess of a given patient with certain characteristics, which 
can then be compared with the observed rate of success in 
the clinic for such patients.
Whatever quality measures are used, they are unlikely to 
be perfect. In the fertility sector, reported evidence depends 
on the characteristics of the patients (such as underlying 
causes of infertility, any pre-existing conditions, and age, 
etc.), as well as the performance of the clinic. Clinics can 
improve performance rating by strategically selling to the 
‘right’ patients and refusing complex cases. Such adverse 
incentives are highlighted by Dranove et al. [45] in the 
empirical case of mandated ‘cardiac surgery report cards’ in 
the US. This stresses the importance of reporting the success 
rate adjusted for patient mix of a given clinic as a measure 
to help patients effectively review and verify clinics’ perfor-
mance. Example 2 in Appendix 2 illustrates in further detail 
how this could be achieved based on NHS’s established 
practice of comparing and reporting risk-adjusted mortality 
rates (for different diagnoses) across hospitals.
To increase the reliability of the evidence disclosed by 
clinics, it is important that such evidence is verifiable, at 
least to some extent. Buyers’ willingness to pay is influenced 
not only by the availability of the evidence but also by their 
perceived reliability of the available evidence. Even though 
value judgement is ultimately unavoidable when determining 
the reliability of evidence, in practice, developing standards/
practical guidelines to assist with the assessment of reliabil-
ity of available evidence8 could allow less distorted elicita-
tion of values and preferences about management options 
presented to the end users. Example 3 in Appendix 2 illus-
trates how data and methods for producing the evidence 
could be assessed in the case of IVF success rates to ensure 
the reliability of evidence to some extent.
Mandatory disclosure may fail to achieve any desired 
impact on treatment quality if a large number of patients 
decide not to engage with the disclosed evidence. In the 
8 For instance, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Devel-
opment and Evaluation (GRADE) approach provides a framework for 
assessing the quality (or ‘certainty’) of the evidence [46]. Also see 
the review by Busse et al. [47] (Chapter 9) of other approaches and 
such practical guidelines applied in different European countries.
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UK fertility sector, for instance, HFEA survey evidence (see 
Table 3 in Appendix 1) indicates that patients make use of 
online information when searching for clinics and would 
like to be more engaged with clinics to improve treatment 
outcome.
Mandatory quality disclosure could lower the barriers to 
patients’ pre-purchase search for clinics. The regulator could 
also play a more prominent role to encourage patients to 
review their experiences and advertise such an information-
sharing platform to the public. Such platforms can also be 
used to facilitate independent quality (especially in rela-
tion to treatment effectiveness and safety) review based 
on patients’ feedback. This will help patients to increase 
their chances of selecting good-quality clinics. Example 3 
in Appendix 2 further illustrates this point. Unfortunately, 
not many patients in the selected sample documented by the 
CMA [27] and HFEA [28] (see Tables 2 and 3 in Appen-
dix 1) are aware of the existing HFEA webpage that allows 
patients to review their experiences, provide ratings, and 
access success rates (but not personalised, or adjusted for 
patient mix) across clinics.
Since the quality of treatments is not only reflected in 
the dimension of effectiveness but also in the dimension 
of safety, mandatory disclosure may harm patients if clin-
ics only focus on boosting the reported success rate at the 
expense of unreported long-term safety. This explains why 
regulators play a very important role in verifying the long-
term safety of treatments and drugs. For instance, the sector 
regulator could prioritise resources to commission independ-
ent research into the understanding of the long-term risk of 
the commonly used fertility drugs/treatments facing both 
patients and children conceived as a result of the relevant 
IVF treatments by doing long-term follow-up studies with 
IVF patients/children.
Given the challenges mentioned above in implementing 
mandatory disclosure, a point worth discussing is whether 
there might be better alternatives. There are other possible 
institutional solutions discussed in the literature, especially 
relating to treatment and diagnosis markets (see a review 
by Balafoutas et al. [13]). One potential remedy extensively 
discussed is the use of liability clauses (by e.g. Fong et al. 
[48] and Dulleck et al. [49]) to mitigate the issue of under-
provision of quality (and other adverse incentives mentioned 
in Sect. 2). Whereas it is in theory a potentially powerful 
mechanism, the implementation of liability rules in practice 
requires that the success of a service is not only observable 
by the patient but also verifiable. In many cases, the suc-
cess of services cannot be easily observed or verified. For 
instance, in the IVF sector, success is in part random. Thus, 
a failing treatment is no perfect signal of undertreatment. 
The effectiveness of liability clauses therefore necessarily 
requires the disclosure of reliable evidence relating to treat-
ment effectiveness and safety.
Even though liability clauses may be difficult to imple-
ment without quality disclosure, some studies dating back to 
1963 (Arrow [9]) discuss the implications of the possibility 
that physicians have ethical obligations for the patients’ wel-
fare. If so, one should expect such ethical concerns to reduce 
the adverse effects on treatment quality arising from the 
informational asymmetry between patients and physicians.
There is some evidence from experiment laboratories to 
indicate that financial incentives are not the only motivat-
ing factor for physicians who may exhibit some degree of 
altruism and concerns for patients’ needs (see, for exam-
ple, evidence provided by Hennig-Schmidt et al. [50] and 
Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen [51]) and that experts who 
have made a non-binding promise to a consumer are indeed 
less likely to engage in fraud [52]. However, given that the 
degree of ethical concerns for patients may well differ from 
one physician to another (see, for example, evidence pro-
vided by Godager and Wiesen [53]),9 the overall impact on 
seller behaviour remains unclear.10 In addition, the above 
observations in the IVF sector suggest that clinics as a col-
lective organisation, as well as individual physicians, may 
not always have compatible incentives. For instance, IVF 
patients have a tendency to avoid regret and are therefore 
likely to be less sceptical about the effectiveness of add-on 
treatments (see patient quotes in Fig. 3 in Appendix 1). As 
a result, clinics as an institution may have little incentives 
to invest in diagnosis efforts to better understand (and ulti-
mately improve) the effectiveness and safety of treatments. 
In this case, even though individual physicians (facing a lack 
of available evidence) may have ethical concerns for patient 
welfare, what they can do individually to improve the quality 
of care for patients is likely to be limited.
9 Delfgaauw [54] points out that altruistic doctors are more likely to 
be self-selected to treat publicly funded patients as it is more reward-
ing for them. From this perspective, one might expect that the issue 
relating to quality standards attributed to asymmetric information 
may be mitigated by ethical concerns to a greater extent in the pub-
lic health sector than in the private health sector. Kruse et  al. [55] 
indeed provided some empirical evidence to suggest that the private 
(for‐profit) hospital sector seems to react more strongly to (financial) 
incentives than public (not-for-profit) providers, even though a con-
clusive statement cannot be made from their systematic review as to 
whether a public or private healthcare sector provides better quality 
of care.
10 For instance, Kerschbamer et al. [56] argue that with the presence 
of anti-social doctors, even if the treatment can be observed and veri-
fied by patients, fraudulent behaviour is still more likely to arise than 
what the theory (typically assuming the standard rational and profit-
maximising sellers) predicts. Similarly, with the presence of pro-
social doctors, even if the treatment cannot be observed or verified 
by patients, the outcome may be better than what the theory predicts. 
Fong et al. [48] and Liu [57] point out the possibility that the pres-
ence of altruistic and honest experts allows the opportunistic experts 
to make more profit.
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6  Conclusions
Using the UK IVF sector as a case study, and based on eco-
nomic evidence, I illustrate, that inadequate quality provi-
sion in terms of treatment effectiveness and safety can be 
associated with a lack of reliable evidence. To address the 
issue of suboptimal quality associated with clinics failing 
to disclose reliable evidence fully and voluntarily, I then 
assess the rationale for possible legislative intervention of 
mandating evidence disclosure. The discussion of manda-
tory evidence disclosure is extended to demonstrate that 
care must be taken when designing such measures to avoid 
adverse incentives.
The discussions above do not go much beyond the eco-
nomic principles that could be applied to the understanding 
and design of mandatory quality disclosure, and the illustra-
tive examples in Appendix 2 cannot fully capture adverse 
incentives associated with misrepresentation of evidence in 
all cases or segments of the healthcare sector. Similarly any 
general framework/standards to assess the reliability of evi-
dence are unlikely to completely capture the misrepresenta-
tion of evidence in all cases.
However there are reasons to be optimistic. Our observa-
tions in the context of the IVF sector in the UK point to the 
important potential for patients to improve quality provision. 
Thanks to the rapid development of information technol-
ogy, patients have better access to online information than 
ever. Patients also have means to share experiences and learn 
about the service provision of different clinics using online 
platforms or social media. Therefore, there is still plenty 
of room to further engage patients with clinics’ service 
provision and evidence disclosure. Therefore, in my opinion, 
patients’ role in evidence disclosure, assessment and verifi-
cation, with the purpose to improve healthcare quality in the 
context of information asymmetry, is to be better understood 
and more fully explored in the new digital era.
It is important to note that the conclusions drawn from 
this study should be applied with caution to other segments 
within the healthcare sector. For instance, other areas of the 
healthcare sector may be characterised by patients who are 
more (or less) engaged/responsive to reliable evidence. The 
nature of the treatment may also determine how straight-
forward it is to construct objective measures of treatment 
effectiveness and safety. In publicly funded healthcare sec-
tors, the provision of treatment quality depends in part on 
the government’s willingness to pay, which is influenced 
by various government budget constraints and other factors 
which are not considered in this study.
Appendix 1: Regarding the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
and Competition and Markets Authority 
Data: Some Descriptive Statistics 
and Quoted Responses
The stylised observations (Sect. 3) are based on results 
from the national patient survey data collected in 2018 by 
the sector regulator, Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) [28], and findings from the Competition 
and Markets Authority’s (CMA’s) research report [27] based 
on patient interviews carried out when developing the draft 
Table 1  HFEA survey responses regarding IVF treatment: success rates, risk and overall satisfaction
Source: HFEA [28]
HFEA Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, IVF in vitro fertilisation
IVF patients NHS funding Privately funded
Count 815 646 664
Outcome with the current situation Successful: 36%
Unsuccessful: 34%
Other (e.g. first treatment; 
prefer not to say): 31%
Successful: 38%
Unsuccessful: 32%
Other (e.g. first treatment; 
prefer not to say): 30%
Successful: 41%
Unsuccessful: 32%
Other (e.g. first 
treatment; prefer 
not to say): 27%
Success rate communicated clearly 21% disagree 22% disagree 24% disagree
The health risks of treatment such as adverse effects clearly com-
municated
21% disagree 22% disagree 27% disagree
Treatment add-ons: have had at least one 67% 66% 74%
Treatment add-ons: understood evidence about the effectiveness 62% satisfied 60% satisfied 66% satisfied
Treatment add-ons: understood evidence about risks and adverse 
effects
60% satisfied 59% satisfied 63% satisfied
Overall satisfaction with the most recent treatment 75% satisfied 75% satisfied 73% satisfied
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guidance for fertility clinics and patients in the UK in 2020 
mentioned above [6].11
CMA [27] is based on 50 paired in-depth telephone or 
video interviews with consumers who had bought IVF treat-
ment in the past 2 years, and their partners. All respondents 
paid for IVF treatment in the last 2 years and came from 
across the UK. The sample was further structured to ensure 
a wide range of experiences were captured, specifically 
in terms of different age groups, type of relationship, and 
whether patients paid for treatment in NHS or private clin-
ics. With no direct access to the interview scripts, refer-
ences to the CMA report [27] are based on the CMA’s [27] 
reported research findings. 
The lack of informaon on personalised chance of success
HFEA survey responses
There were general stascs of success 
rates provided but no informaon relang 
to success rates with my parcular ferlity 
issues, so I had no clear idea what my 
chances of success were, and I was told it 
was not possible to say.
We knew the numbers of success just 
not what each method of IVF would 
achieve (them).
Its only really the headline % 
that's adversed which is split 
into age groups but does not offer 
any further breakdown. I wanted 
more informaon on the success 
rates of women with my health 
problems and on my ivf protocol. 
Leaflets should be provided with 
stascs on the likelihood of 
success with specific condions 
like fibroids & endometriosis. 
And chances of success aer 
previous surgery or without 
surgery for each condion. 
We weren't told our chances of 
success specifically, they were very 
vague and the story seemed to 
keep changing. To this day, I'm sll 
not really clear on what the issues 
were as to why they thought we 
were having problems conceiving.
CMA findings
Success rates of IVF treatment were generally 
discussed in generic rather than personalised 
terms. Although a few reported discussing their 
personal chance of success, most did not, and the 
specific basis for the individual discussions 
reported (i.e. whether test results, scans, age and 
previous history of IVF and any specific ferlity 
issues) is unclear.
I think [we need] more honesty around the 
treatment isn’t successful for everybody. I met 
lots of women doing this, I think that’s 
something we all feel isn’t explained enough at 
the start of this.
Fig. 1  Illustrating stylised observation 1 relating to incomplete information disclosure of personalised success rates. HFEA Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority, CMA Competition and Markets Authority, IVF in vitro fertilisation. Source: CMA [27] and HFEA [28]
11 Data availability statement: The HFEA survey results and CMA 
research findings are available for public access (see reference list). 
No new data were generated by the author.
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Overesmated success rates are misleading
HFEA survey responses
Everything was very posive, the 
chances of success I believed were 
good, yet we had 3 failed 
transfers.
I think they need to go through the clinic's 
specific success rates and maybe make clearer 
that the majority of rounds fail... i.e. it is more 
likely to fail than be a success. That might take 
some of the pressure off and help you make 
choices especially if you are paying for your 
treatments.
Constant referrals to why there 
was no reason I couldn't get 
pregnant. Misplaced opmism 
isn't always the best to manage 
expectaons.
We have ‘unexplained’ inferlity yet 
feel there haven’t been many 
invesgave tests. I feel if underlying 
issues were picked up sooner then 
people may not have to undergo the 
more costly (whether to the NHS or 
paents themselves) treatment.
Chances were made clear at the inial 
appointment, since then and aer each 
embryo transfer failure (three) this topic has 
been avoided by staff. They seem to have 
nothing to say with regard to treatment 
plan, my Endometriosis etc. The philosophy 
seems to be simply transfer another and 
hope for the best.
Sadly I feel like no one knows. Aer 
two rounds of icsi, despite having 
“good test results” I am le feeling 
totally hopeless for the future.
CMA findings
There are some cases where respondents 
had experienced repeated unsuccessful 
IVF treatments and were then given 
different treatments (typically add-ons 
that are not necessarily evidence-based) 
in the hope that one of them might work. 
Fig. 2  Illustrating stylised observation 1 relating to overestimated success rates. HFEA Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, CMA 
Competition and Markets Authority, IVF in vitro fertilisation, ICSI intracytoplasmic sperm injection. Source: CMA [27] and HFEA [28]
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Paents have a strong tendency to avoid any potenal regret even if they might be scepcal 
of the effecveness of the treatments.
HFEA survey responses
I would like to see more research and 
transparency around the risks of IVF 
and the drugs on women having 
treatment and on IVF conceived 
children. I am on the highest dose of 
drugs allowed and am concerned from 
various research studies what the long-
term impacts of this might be on my 
health and on that of any future 
children. 
Informaon about add-ons was largely 
through self-research and the internet. 
Very limited advice from the Clinic.
...risk of ovarian cancer & other 
medicaon side effects on 
exisng problems (pre-exisng 
condions) weren’t discussed. 
I would have liked to have been 
referred to the HEFA website or been 
provided with evidence levels of 
treatment effecveness. 
CMA findings
Many respondents did not recall that the 
risks of parcular add-on treatments were 
discussed with them. The risk respondents 
recalled being discussed mainly concerned 
those associated with medicaon, for 
example, over-smulaon. Most did not 
recall other risks being discussed with them, 
for example, risks associated with parcular 
tests or add-on treatments.
A small group of respondents felt that a lack 
of clinical evidence supporng the 
effecveness of add-ons did not necessarily 
mean that they were ineffecve, parcularly 
given their belief that effecveness was 
likely to vary between paents because of 
their different medical characteriscs. As 
these respondents explained, since they 
already invested such large sums of money 
in this treatment, they wanted to try 
everything they could and avoid the fear of 
not doing so (even when scepcal).
I remember him [the consultant] saying, in 
terms of how beneficial it is, that it was 
difficult to say, but there’s no 
disadvantages, so you might as well, just 
in case it does work. [Male parcipant] 
I remember challenging him on that a 
lile bit, and he said the jury’s out, 50/50. 
He said it wouldn’t harm it, and there was 
no reason not to. It was a small amount of 
money, which doesn’t mean anything 
when you’re trying to have a baby." 
[Female parcipant] 
There's no proof of success, but it's 
a peace-of-mind thing. 
Fig. 3  Illustrating stylised observation 2 relating to the effectiveness or safety of add-on treatments and fertility drugs. HFEA Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Authority, CMA Competition and Markets Authority, IVF in vitro fertilisation. Source: CMA [27] and HFEA [28]
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The HFEA survey involved responses from respondents 
who were either in the process of receiving fertility treat-
ment or had been through the process in the last 5 years (i.e. 
with either a successful or an unsuccessful outcome). The 
total number of responses was 1017 patients or partners and 
the data were weighted to be representative by treatment 
type, age, region and partner status, according to statistics 
provided by the HFEA. With no access to the original survey 
data, the information presented here and in the main text is 
based on the survey results published by the HFEA [28]. I 
focus on the responses from the in vitro fertilisation (IVF) 
patients and provide an overview of their responses relevant 
to assessing the quality of IVF treatment in Table 1.
As mentioned above, the author does not have access to 
the original survey data and the above table 1 is compiled 
from the survey results published by the HFEA [28].There-
fore, it is not possible to analyse the survey results directly 
focusing on the self-funded IVF patients (60% of all IVF 
patients) as a subgroup. Instead, I look at the responses by 
IVF patients, patients funded by the NHS, and patients who 
are self-funded separately in the above table 1.
The above survey results should be interpreted with cau-
tion. According to the HFEA [28], the outcome of treatment 
plays a role in determining overall satisfaction. Around 9 in 
10 (89%) of those who were successful in treatment in the 
past 2 years say they are satisfied overall, with no one saying 
that they were dissatisfied. For those who were unsuccessful, 
3 in 10 (30%) say that they are dissatisfied and considerably 
fewer (52%) say they are satisfied. In the survey sample, 34% 
of the IVF patients have had known unsuccessful outcomes. 
Note that the IVF failure rate is likely to be much higher than 
34%. For every 10 embryos transferred, on average in the 
UK in 2018 about 2.3 embryos survive and develop into live 
birth [29]. Therefore, the survey results in the above table 1 
may be more optimistic than reality.
For the above reason, I have taken a closer look at 
responses to the open-ended questions in the HFEA sur-
vey. In particular, I have looked at patients’ responses to 
the question “If you feel the chances of success were not 
clearly communicated, please add why you think that and 
what might make it clearer” and the question “If you have 
any comments or experiences you would like to share about 
Table 2  Patients’ reasons for choosing clinics: the HFEA responses
Source: HFEA [28]
HFEA Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, IVF in vitro fertilisation, GP General Practitioner
IVF patients NHS funding Privately funded
Count 815 646 664
Six most important reasons you used a 
particular clinic or clinics?
Location/distance from home/
work: 55%
Information about success rates: 
45%
Referred there by GP: 37%
Good first impression of the clinic 
and clinic staff: 33%
Treatment options offered: 31%




Recommendation from family or 
friends: 18%
Convenient opening hours/flexible 
appointment times: 17%
The HFEA Choose a Fertility 
Clinic website: 17%
Inspection ratings/reports: 14%
Events such as open evenings: 11%






Information about success rates: 
39%
Referred there by GP: 47%
Good first impression of the clinic 
and clinic staff: 30%
Treatment options offered: 27%




Recommendation from family or 
friends: 15%
Convenient opening hours/flexible 
appointment times: 15%
The HFEA Choose a Fertility 
Clinic website: 14%
Inspection ratings/reports: 15%
Events such as open evenings: 9%






Information about success 
rates: 47%
Referred there by GP: 23%
Good first impression of the 
clinic and clinic staff: 41%
Treatment options offered: 
34%




Recommendation from family 
or friends: 24%
Convenient opening hours/
flexible appointment times: 
20%




Events such as open eve-
nings: 13%
Feedback on social networks, 
blogs or forums: 14%
Other: 7%
Can't remember: 1%
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treatment add-ons, please type in here”. I also cross-check 
these responses with the findings from the CMA [28]. Fig-
ures 1, 2 and 3 below show the quoted responses to supple-
ment the stylised observations in Sect. 3. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide additional information relating 
to patients’ reasons for choosing clinics, how they search 
for clinics and their perspective of engagement with clinics.
Appendix 2: Illustrative Examples to Show 
How a Greater Extent of Evidence Discourse 
Relating to Success Rates in the Case 
of the UK Fertility Sector can be Achieved
Example 112 An illustrative example of how personalised 
success rate can be disclosed
What data to collect?
Individual clinics routinely collect data regarding their 
patients and the IVF treatment they receive. The regulators 
could set the standard definition with respect to the data 
sample to be selected and categorical variables to be used to 
describe patient circumstances and clinical characteristics. 
The inclusion of these variables is to adjust the observed 
outcome of success/failure to reflect all contributing factors.
How to estimate the personalised success rate?
Develop a model or adopt an existing one for the estima-
tion of factors contributing to the chance of success.
One established model that could be used is the logit 
regression model adopted by the NHS England to estimate 
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI)13.
By regressing the patient-specific factors, other factors, 
and an intercept on the observed outcome (success vs. fail-
ure) for the entire sample, including all clinics, the estimated 
regression coefficients could reveal important evidence as to 
how each patient-specific factor contributes to the chance 
of success, forming the basis for understanding individual 
patient’s chance of success.
How to compare the personalised success rate?
Take any IVF patient as an example for illustration pur-
poses. This patient’s circumstances are defined by a set of 
categorical variables as mentioned above (age, test results, 
infertility cause, treatment protocol, etc.).
Table 3  How patients search for initial information and clinics’ engagement with patients: the HFEA responses
Source: HFEA [28]
HFEA Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, IVF in vitro fertilisation, GP General Practitioner
IVF patients NHS funding Privately funded
Count 815 646 664







Friends or family: 25%







Friends or family: 22%







Friends or family: 28%
Social network or online blog: 33%
Felt listened to 75% agree 74% agree 74% agree
Felt able to provide feedback at 
any time
65% agree 65% agree 67% agree
Felt involved in treatment decision 74% agree 75% agree 74% agree
Felt able to state concerns and 
complaints at any time
68% agree 68% agree 69% agree
To what extent are you able to 
approach doctors/consultants for 
support
35% say a little or not at all 36% say a little or not at all 33% say a little or not at all
To what extent are you able to 
approach the embryologist for 
support
45% say a little or not at all 42% say a little or not at all 45% say a little or not at all
12 This example together with the next two examples are adapted 
based on the established practice of reporting Summary Hospital-
level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) relating to different diagnoses at 
NHS England. More details regarding this reporting practice can be 
accessed here (last accessed 26 April 2021): https:// digit al. nhs. uk/ 
data- and- infor mation/ publi catio ns/ ci- hub/ summa ry- hospi tal- level- 
morta lity- indic ator- shmi# guida nce- for- users;
13 The detailed specification of the logit model can be accessed here 
(last accessed 24 April 2021): https:// digit al. nhs. uk/ data- and- infor 
mation/ publi catio ns/ ci- hub/ summa ry- hospi tal- level- morta lity- indic 
ator- shmi# shmi- speci ficat ion. The logit regression models is adopted 
by NHS England to estimate hospital-level expected mortality rates 
adjusted for risk, which is necessary for the calculation of SHMI that 
is comparable across hospitals.
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The expected success rate (with estimated confidence 
intervals, i.e. upper and lower control limits14) for the patient 
in this example can be calculated based on the multiplication 
of the estimated regression coefficients in the above model 
and the observed circumstances, defined by all relevant cat-
egorical variables above, specifically relating to this patient.
Compare (1) the observed success among all patients 
who fall into the same categories as this example patient 
in a given clinic with (2) the above expected success rate 
(with 95% confidence interval estimates) to give the follow-
ing result:
“No different than the expected rate”  if the 95% con-
fidence interval estimate surrounding the above expected 
success rate includes the clinic’s observed rate
“Worse than the expected rate”  if the entire 95% con-
fidence interval estimate surrounding the expected success 
rate is higher than the clinic’s observed rate.
“Better than the expected rate”  if the entire 95% interval 
estimate surrounding the expected rate is lower than the 
clinic’s observed rate.
“The number of cases is too small to reliably tell how 
well the clinic is performing.”
Patients should be made aware of the limitations of the 
expected success rate. For instance, the set of variables are 
unlikely to completely describe a patient’s circumstance. 
The more variables we include, the less precise the esti-
mates are. Any estimation can only be accurate at the level 
of population. These limitations should be put to any given 
patient.
Example 2. An illustrative example of how success 
rates can be adjusted for patient mix, and made compa-
rable across clinics
How to adjust success rates for patient mix15?
Observed success at a clinic: This can be obtained by 
counting the number of successes among all patients in the 
sample at a clinic.
Expected success at a clinic: Regression coefficients 
(estimated using the same model in Example 1) multiplied 
by observed patient characteristics plus the intercept can be 
transformed and summed over all patients from the clinic to 
obtain expected success.
Adjusted success rate at a clinic: The ratio of observed 
success at a given clinic over ‘expected’ success (calculated 
above). It conceptually allows for a comparison of a par-
ticular clinic’s performance given its case mix to expect the 
clinic’s performance with the same case mix. Together with 
this point estimate, upper and lower control limits can be 
reported.
How to compare and report success rates across 
clinics?
Regulators can assign a clinic to a performance category 
by comparing each clinic’s observed success rate to the 
expected rate. For instance:
“No different than the expected rate”  if the 95% con-
fidence interval estimate surrounding the clinic’s expected 
success rate includes the observed rate
“Worse than the expected rate”  if the entire 95% con-
fidence interval estimate surrounding the clinic’s expected 
success rate is higher than the observed rate
“Better than the expected rate”  if the entire 95% interval 
estimate surrounding the clinic’s expected rate is lower than 
the observed rate
“The number of cases is too small to reliably tell how 
well the clinic is performing.”
Example 3. An illustrative example of how the quality 
of evidence on reported success rates can be assessed.
Regulators’ role
Setting the standards for data collection: For example, the 
sample and variables to be included.
Data validity check: For instance, comparing data over 
the years to check consistency.
Assessing the accuracy of algorithms used to analyse the 
data and compute the results: For example, crossed-checked 
by different data analysts.
Updating and refining the methods: Continually assessing 
the model and its validity given possible changes in the data 
over time, and allows for model refinements.
Patient engagement
The above information in Examples 1 and 2 should be 
disclosed at the stage when patients are doing research to 
choose clinics, so as to help to break down patient search 
barriers.
Patients should be given the opportunity to contribute to 
the above evidence disclosure process. Examples are:
• Format of the reported evidence: For example, a pilot 
can be used as a trial among patients to determine the 
most suitable format to compare success rates described 
in Examples 1 and 2 (e.g. an illustrative online predictor 
based on model estimates explained in Examples 1 and 
2) and where such information should be reported (e.g. 
regulator website, clinic’s website, or a specific online 
clinic comparison platform)
14 There are well-established methods to compute confidence inter-
vals for the predicted outcomes at the specific values of the independ-
ent variables for regression models relating to categorical outcomes 
such as logit regressions (see, for instance, the different methods of 
such computation using Stata proposed by Xu and Long [58].
15 The approach illustrated in this example is very similar to the 
approach adopted by NHS to estimate and report SHMI as a measure 
of hospital care quality indicator. It gives the outcomes of hospital-
level mortality rates (for different diagnoses) adjusted for risk factors 
and is comparable across different hospitals.
EBM and Healthcare Quality in the Context of Information Failure
• Patients (or the public) should be encouraged to provide 
feedback on data and methods or to share their own expe-
rience and observations (for instance, through an online 
platform monitored by the regulator) that allows regula-
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